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NOTES

The Securities Act of 1933
A JURISDICTIONAL PUZZLE
INTRODUCTION
On February 1, 2012, the social network giant Facebook,
Inc. filed for an initial public offering (IPO).1 Although going
public raised $16 billion for the company,2 Facebook’s first day of
trading was plagued with problems and signaled the trouble
that lay ahead.3 “[T]echnical glitches on [NASDAQ] created
confusion” as its systems were unprepared for the “massive
volume of the highest-profile IPO of the year.”4 Despite the
issues, demand for the shares was unprecedented. Within the
first 30 seconds of trading, 80 million shares had changed
hands.5 By the end of the day, the stock reached a trading
volume of 567 million shares, smashing the previous volume
record of around 450 million by General Motors.6
However, the trading issues were not the company’s
only problems. Just days after the IPO, class-action lawsuits
began to pour into courts across the country.7 Some plaintiffs
1 See Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 1, 2012), available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/d287954ds1.htm.
2 See Evelyn M. Rusli & Peter Eavis, Facebook Raises $16 Billion in I.P.O., N.Y.
TIMES (May 17, 2012, 4:21 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/facebook-raises-16billion-in-i-p-o/?hp.
3 Facebook, Inc. set its final IPO price at $38, and the stock began trading on
Friday, May 18, 2012. Julianne Pepitone, Facebook Trading Sets Record IPO Volume, CNN
(May 18, 2012, 4:05 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/18/technology/facebook-ipotrading/index.htm.
4 Jenny Strasburg & Jacob Bunge, Social Network’s Debut on Nasdaq Disrupted
by Technical Glitches, Trader Confusion, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2012, 9:19 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303448404577412251723815184.html.
5 See Pepitone, supra note 3.
6 See id.
7 See, e.g., Complaint at 15, Brian Roffe Profit Sharing Plan v. Facebook,
Inc., No. 12 CV 4081 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012); Complaint at 16, Spatz v. Facebook, Inc.,
No. 12 CV 2262 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2012).
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asserted federal claims,8 others brought class actions in state
courts.9 To consolidate some of these actions, Facebook removed
the class actions from the Superior Court of California,10
leaving the District Court for the Northern District of
California to face an issue that has evaded an answer for many
years: whether class actions alleging claims arising solely
under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)11 can be
removed from state to federal court.
The landscape of federal securities law was created
nearly 80 years ago. Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in 1933
while the country was still in the depths of the Great
Depression.12 With 13 million Americans unemployed, and the
stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange decimated, many
pointed to corporate and stock market abuse as the cause of the
crash.13 President Roosevelt made clear that his New Deal would
include comprehensive securities reform.14 President Roosevelt
turned to Felix Frankfurter, “a legendary Harvard law professor”
and one of his most trusted advisors, to draft the securities laws.15
8 They brought claims under sections 11, 12, and 15 of the Securities Act of
1933. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l, 77o (2012). See Complaint at ¶ 2,
Brian Roffe Profit Sharing Plan, No. 12 CV 4081. The plaintiffs asserted that
Facebook, Inc.’s registration statement and accompanying prospectus “contained
untrue statements of material facts, omitted to state other facts necessary to make the
statements made not misleading and were not prepared in accordance with the rules
and regulations governing their preparation.” Id. ¶ 20.
9 See Complaint at ¶¶ 5-8, Lazar v. Facebook, Inc., No. 12-civ-03199 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 2012) (asserting claims under sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933).
10 See Notice of Removal, Lapin v. Facebook, Inc., No. 12-civ-3195, 2012
WL2793338 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2012); Notice of Removal, Stokes v. Facebook, Inc., No.
12-civ-3203, 2012 WL 2793305 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2012); Notice of Removal, DeMois v.
Facebook, Inc., No. 12-civ-3196, 2012 WL 2577293 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2012).
11 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012).
12 See Norman S. Poser, The Origins of the Securities Laws, BERNSTEIN,
LITOWITZ, BERGE, & GROSSMAN LLP INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ADVOCATE 1 (2004),
http://www.blbglaw.com/news/publications/advocate/2004/04/_res/ id=sa_File1/adv2004Q4.pdf.
13 See id.
14 See id. “He called for legislation that would ‘let . . . in the light on issues of
securities, foreign and domestic, which are offered for sale to the investing public.’” Id.
(quoting JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 19 (1982)). In his
inaugural address, the president “denounce[d] the ‘unscrupulous money changers who
stand indicted in the court of public opinion, rejected in the hearts and minds of men.’”
Poser, supra note 12, at 1 (quoting KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS
1933–1937, 30 (1979)).
15 Poser, supra note 12, at 2. Six years later, Professor Felix Frankfurter was
appointed to the Supreme Court. Id. The actual drafting of the statutes was
accomplished by two of Frankfurter’s protégés. Benjamin Cohen was “a shy, softspoken religious idealist with a tough, practical lawyer’s mind”; and Thomas “Tommy
the Cork” Corcoran was an “exuberant Irishman of great personal charm, who liked to
sing ballads, accompanying himself on the accordion.” Id. Despite their conflicting
personalities, both “shared a sophisticated approach to socio-economic problems and a
capacity for hard, prolonged intellectual effort.” Id. (citing SELIGMAN supra note 14, at
62-63 (1982)).
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In the following years, two statutes were enacted: the Securities
Act of 1933 (Securities Act),16 which regulated the issuance and
distribution of securities; and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act),17 which “regulated the . . . trading markets—
meaning the New York Stock Exchange—and which outlawed
market manipulation.”18
The Securities Act was designed to protect investors and
increase investor confidence in the market19 through a system
of “full and fair disclosure of securities sold in interstate and
foreign markets.”20 For further protection, the Securities Act
created a private right of action and gave concurrent jurisdiction
in both state and federal courts.21 The statute also prevented the
removal of these claims brought in state court.22

15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012).
18 See Poser, supra note 12, at 2. The Pecora hearings before Congress helped
“galvanize[ ] broad public support for the securities laws.” See id. The hearings
revealed that National City Bank (predecessor to Citicorp) “had aggressively pushed
the sale of Peruvian bonds to the public,” despite the bank’s own representatives telling
the bank that Peru was not likely to repay the interest or principal on the debt. See id.
(citing JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH: 1929 171 (1955); SELIGMAN,
supra note 14, at 27-28 (1982)).
The hearings revealed manipulation in the offering of securities. The
public was informed that “J.P. Morgan & Co. . . had a ‘preferred list’ of influential
individuals who received stock in securities distributions at a low price shortly before
they went public at a much higher figure,” enabling these individuals to sell the
securities for “a sure profit.” See id. at 2-3 (citing SELIGMAN, supra note 14, at 34-35
(1982)).
The Pecora hearings also disclosed that “the market abuses of the 1920s
were continuing in full force during the opening months of the New Deal.” See id. at 3
(citing KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS 1933–1937 362 (1979)). Operators,
including members of prestigious investment banks, company officers, specialists on the
New York Stock Exchange, and even the father of president John Kennedy, Joseph
Kennedy, created a “false effect of great activity and widespread buying that played on the
gullibility and greed of the public.” See id. at 3.
In light of these abuses, the legislation garnered large public support, and
with the help of Sam Rayburn, then Chairman of the House Commerce Committee and
later the Speaker of the House, the two laws passed through Congress. See id.
19 See Denise Mazzeo, Securities Class Actions, CAFA, and a Countrywide
Crisis: A Call for Clarity and Consistency, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1433, 1441 (2009).
20 Michael Serota, (Mis)Interpreting SLUSA: Closing the Jurisdictional
Loophole in Federal Securities Class Actions, 7 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 162, 164 (2010).
This was accomplished through the “filing of a registration statement with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and providing prospective investors with detailed
information” concerning the securities. Id.
21 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1998) (“The district courts of the
United States and United States courts of any Territory, shall have jurisdiction . . .
concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of all suits . . . brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by this subchapter.”).
22 Id. (“[N]o case arising under this subchapter and brought in any State
court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States.”).
16

17
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However, investor protection “seems to ebb and flow
with the market.”23 In times of economic troubles, like the
Great Depression, investor protection increases, because
investor confidence is a key to shifting a bear market to bull.24
And until the 1990s, Section 22 of the Securities Act, the section
concerning jurisdiction, remained largely untouched.25 But in
times of prosperity, “Congress seems to be less concerned with
protecting investors, and more so with deregulating and
preventing litigious abuses of the system.”26 And during the
economic boom of the 1990s, Congress whittled away the broad
investor protections built up by the Securities Act.27
In 1995, Congress “attempted to limit the number of
securities class actions”28 by passing the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).29 The law purported to
fight meritless class actions alleging fraud in the sale of securities
(strike suits).30 However, plaintiffs began to strategically
circumvent the PSLRA by filing class actions in state court, where
federal law did not apply and where the Securities Act enjoyed
concurrent and non-removable jurisdiction.
To prevent the evasion of the protections the PSLRA
provides against abusive litigation,31 Congress enacted the
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1998 (SLUSA).32 Originally,
Section 22(a) of the Securities Act barred removal of Securities
Act claims brought in a state court of competent jurisdiction.33
SLUSA amended this provision by allowing the removal of certain
covered class actions.34 But federal courts have “struggled with
[SLUSA’s] application to class action removal for claims arising
[solely] under the [Securities Act].”35
See Mazzeo, supra note 19, at 1436.
Id. at 1436-37. The traditional definition of a “bear market” is a decline in
the average price of stocks by 20% or more from the most recent high point, while the
traditional definition of a “bull market” is a 20% increase from the most recent low
point. See Tom Lauricella, Is This Bull Cyclical or Secular?, WALL ST. J. (June 15,
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124501817200213499.html.
25 See Mazzeo, supra note 19, at 1444.
26 Id. at 1436.
27 See id. at 1437.
28 Serota, supra note 20, at 164.
29 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
30 Serota, supra note 20, at 164.
31 Id. at 165.
32 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
33 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1998).
34 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2012).
35 Serota, supra note 20, at 165.
23

24
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Some district courts have construed the amendment
narrowly, finding that the plain meaning of its text only allows
for removal of state law claims. Thus, Securities Act claims,
asserted without any corresponding state claims (pure Securities
Act claims), are still barred from removal by Section 22(a). Other
courts have construed it broadly, looking toward legislative intent
to find that pure Securities Act claims are removable. The issue is
further complicated by a lack of binding authority. For example,
“[p]rocedural rules make it . . . difficult for federal appellate courts
to review . . . [a district court’s] decision[ ] to remand [Securities
Act] class action claims [back to state court],” and other district
courts only provide persuasive authority.36
Some courts, however, are beginning to look past
SLUSA’s amendment to the anti-removal provision of the
Securities Act;37 instead, they focus on SLUSA’s amendment to
the concurrent jurisdiction provision of the Securities Act.38 These
courts conclude that the amendment to the concurrent
jurisdiction provision completely removed state court jurisdiction
over pure Securities Act claims. The anti-removal provision only
applies to claims brought in a “State court of competent
jurisdiction.”39 Therefore it simply does not bar pure Securities
Act claims from removal in the first place. Because this approach
addresses the shortcomings of other interpretations, courts should
apply this analysis when faced with the issue of removal of a class
action asserting Securities Act claims.
The note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides
background on the Securities Act and the two subsequent
statutes amending its provisions: the PSLRA and SLUSA. Part
II focuses on two of SLUSA’s amendments to the Securities Act
and the judicial confusion about whether pure Securities Act
claims are removable from state to federal court. This part will
explore the three approaches courts use in interpreting the effect
that SLUSA and the PSLRA have had on the anti-removal and
concurrent jurisdiction provisions of the Securities Act. Part III
argues that an interpretation that allows for the removal of pure
Securities Act claims not only serves the goals of the PSLRA and
SLUSA, but also furthers the goals of the Securities Act. This
Part concludes that innocent investors should be protected from
the damage caused by meritless class actions.
36
37
38
39

See id. at 166.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1998).
See id.
15 U.S.C. § 77p (2012).
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To understand the jurisdiction of federal securities law,
one must begin with an understanding of basic federal
jurisdiction.40 As a general rule, “state and federal courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to hear most cases that fall within Article
III.”41 This rule gives plaintiffs the initial choice of forum, and a
plaintiff may choose to bring a federal claim in state court.42 While
plaintiffs get the first choice, defendants are not without power of
their own. Removal jurisdiction is the mechanism by which
defendants can transfer a federal claim from state court to federal
court.43 But the power of removal is not absolute. Under the
general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1441(a), a defendant may
remove claims “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act
of Congress.”44 As noted by one court, this “‘except’ provision is
‘clearly a reference to statutes such as the [Securities Act].’”45
B.

Securities Act of 1933

Congress expressly provided for such an exception to
removal jurisdiction when it passed the Securities Act46 in
response to the Crash of 1929.47 Securities fraud plagued the
market in the 1920s and, despite many state securities
40 Federal jurisdiction “extend[s] to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
41 Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the
Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 145 (2001). The model of
concurrent regulatory authority provide for removal statutes, which “create a right for
some parties to be in federal court if they want to be, and most areas of concurrent
jurisdiction exist at Congress’s sufferance.” Id.
42 See Jordan A. Costa, Removal of Securities Act of 1933 Claims After
SLUSA: What Congress Changed, and What It Left Alone, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1193,
1197-98 (2004).
43 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act
of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending.”).
44 See id.; see also Costa, supra note 42, at 1198 (“Congress has reserved the right
to circumscribe removal in all cases in which they chose to do so in . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1441.”).
45 Farmers & Merch’s Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners of Jacksonville
Limited P’ship, 702 F. Supp. 1417, 1419-20 (D. Ark. 1988); see William B. Snyder, Jr.,
The Securities Act of 1933 After SLUSA: Federal Class Actions Belong in Federal Court,
85 N.C. L. REV. 669, 672 (2007).
46 15 U.S.C. § 77v.
47 Serota, supra note 20, at 164.
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statutes, “the public sustained severe losses at the hands of
securities dealers and corporations.”48 With the clear need to
restore investor confidence in the securities market in mind,
President Roosevelt pushed for massive securities reform and the
creation of the Securities Act.49 In a comprehensive effort to
regulate securities markets, the objective of the Securities Act
was to require companies to provide “full and fair
disclosure . . . by filing a registration statement with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.”50 The Securities Act also
created an express private right of action to “hold[ ] those who file
the statements liable for any misstatements or omissions.”51
Within this private right of action, Congress chose to
enhance investor protection by giving class action plaintiffs the
ultimate power to choose the forum.52 Section 22(a) of the
Securities Act contains two mechanisms to accomplish that
goal.53 The section’s concurrent jurisdiction provision provides
for concurrent state and federal jurisdiction,54 and its antiremoval provision eliminates the defendant’s ability to remove
certain actions brought in state court.55 The effect of these
provisions is generally recognized as being pro-plaintiff.56
But the Securities Act is limited to regulating the initial
distribution of securities.57 One year after its passage, Congress
enacted the Exchange Act to address a different type of harm:
intentional misconduct in the manipulation of stock prices and
trading of securities.58 Noting the concurrent jurisdiction
Mazzeo, supra note 19, at 1440-42.
Id. at 1441.
50 Serota, supra note 20, at 164. The belief behind the Securities Act was
that, “if companies and their underwriters were required to disclose all information to
investors, shady deals would be impossible.” Poser, supra note 12, at 3.
51 Mazzeo, supra note 19, at 1442.
52 Serota, supra note 20, at 164.
53 See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1998).
54 See Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Timothy M. Haggerty, Jurisdictional Struggle
Continues over 1933 Act Class Suits, N.Y. L.J., June 14, 2010, at S4, available at
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202462634140&Jurisdictional_S
truggle_Continues_Over_1933_Act_Class_Suits&slreturn=20120825180339
[hereinafter
Lowenthal & Haggerty, Jurisdictional Struggle]; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (“The district
courts of the United States and United States courts of any Territory, shall have
jurisdiction . . . concurrent with State and Territorial courts . . . of all suits . . . brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this subchapter.”).
55 See Lowenthal & Haggerty, Jurisdictional Struggle, supra note 54, at S4 see
also 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (“[N]o case arising under this subchapter and brought in any State
court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States.”).
56 See Mazzeo, supra note 19, at 1444.
57 See Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 673.
58 See Mazzeo, supra note 19, at 1443 n.67 (citing Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1976)); see also Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 673
(“The Exchange Act allows for the regulation of the secondary market and regulates all
48

49
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provided by the Securities Act, Congress granted federal courts
exclusive federal jurisdiction to hear claims arising under the
Exchange Act.59 Congress also considered amending the
Securities Act to provide exclusive federal jurisdiction, “but
expressly declined to do so”60 for reasons that are still unclear.61
C.

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA)

The anti-removal provisions of the Securities Act would
prove to be particularly important after the passage of the
PSLRA. Congress enacted the PSLRA in the face of a growing
number of “‘strike suits[;]’ the ‘meritless class actions that allege
fraud in the sale of securities.’”62 Title I of the PSLRA, titled
“Reduction of Abusive Litigation,” added Section 27 to the
Securities Act63 and it contained “some of the most sweeping
amendments since the inception of federal securities law.”64 Most
notably, Section 27 includes an automatic stay of discovery upon
the filing of a motion to dismiss, as well as heightening the
pleading standards for plaintiffs.65 The goal of the PSLRA was to
aspects of public trading of securities. Specifically, the Exchange Act extended federal
regulation to stock manipulation, insider trading, and broker-dealer and stock
exchanges as well as proxy solicitations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
59 See Mazzeo, supra note 19, at 1444; see also Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012).
60 See Mazzeo, supra note 19, at 1444 (citing 78 CONG. REC. 8571 (1934)
(statement of Sen. Byrnes) (noting that the Senate’s version of the bill provided for
concurrent jurisdiction, while the House version of the bill granted exclusive federal
jurisdiction)).
61 See Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 673.
62 Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Timothy M. Haggerty, SLUSA’s Elimination of
State and Court Jurisdiction over Securities Class Actions, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN &
HAMILTON LLP LITIGATION & ARBITRATION REPORT 20-21 (Dec. 2006) [hereinafter
Lowenthal & Haggerty, SLUSA’s Elimination].
63 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
64 Jennifer O’Hare, Preemption Under the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act: If It Looks like a Securities Fraud Claim and Acts Like a Securities
Fraud Claim, Is It a Securities Fraud Claim?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 325, 334 (2004).
65 Id. at 335 (footnotes omitted). The heightened pleading standard requires a
plaintiff to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012)
(emphasis added). The automatic stay of discovery provides:
In any private action arising under this sub-chapter, all discovery and other
proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless
the court finds, upon the motion of any party, that particularized discovery is
necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that party.
Id. § 77z-1(b)(1).
The PSLRA also includes several other important reforms to federal
securities laws. A “lead plaintiff provision” rejects the race-to-the-courthouse method of
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“provide protection . . . for investors, issuers, and all who are
associated with the American capital markets.”66
With the PSLRA, Congress reacted to concerns in the
business community that class-action plaintiffs were abusing
the anti-fraud provisions of securities laws.67 “[W]henever a
company’s stock price declined, plaintiffs rushed to file class
actions under the federal securities laws, even though there
was, in fact, no evidence of fraud at the time of the suit.”68
Complaints generally charged deep-pocket defendants with
cookie-cutter violations, such as allegedly issuing misleading
public documents, thereby causing the price of the security to
artificially climb or decline.69 A cost-benefit analysis often
forced the defendants to “settle even non-meritorious actions
because the settlement amount would cost the defendant less
than litigation expenses associated with discovery requests.”70
The PSLRA was enacted under the belief that “both investors
and the national economy suffer when innocent parties are
forced to pay exorbitant settlements in meritless lawsuits.”71
The PSLRA sought to curtail these strike suits through
a series of procedural and jurisdictional reforms, measures
intended to make it more difficult to bring private securitiesfraud actions under federal securities laws.72 Congress hoped
that the increased cost and difficulty in bringing these actions
would “weed out non-meritorious actions at the pleading stage,
thereby discouraging strike suits.”73 But the PSLRA had
identifying the plaintiff, and instead presumes that the largest shareholder is the
proper plaintiff, and is “entitled to control the private class action (and therefore
appoint counsel) . . . .” O’Hare, supra note 64, at 336; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)
(2012). The court is also required to undertake an inquiry at the conclusion of each case
to determine and impose mandatory sanctions on counsel for violations of Rule 11. See
id. § 77z-1(c).
66 Costa, supra note 42, at 1201 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
67 O’Hare, supra note 64, at 334.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 335; see also Mazzeo, supra note 19, at 1446 (“The systematic
‘abusive’ practices . . . embodied several characteristics: (1) routinely filing frivolous
suits alleging cookie-cutter violations of the federal securities laws whenever there was
a significant change in stock price, (2) targeting deep-pocketed defendants, and (3)
abusing discovery practices in the hopes that the defendant would make a quick and
sizeable settlement in order to avoid the expense of litigation.”).
70 O’Hare, supra note 64, at 335.
71 Mazzeo, supra note 19, at 1446 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72 O’Hare, supra note 64, at 335.
73 Id. at 336. Additionally, “Congress hoped . . . [to] encourage[ ] companies to
make projections, forecasts, and other kinds of forward-looking statements.” Id.
Companies could expect to be hit by a lawsuit alleging fraud whenever a forwardlooking projection or statement failed to materialize. Id. Accordingly, businesses were
discouraged from making such statements. Id. In addition to discouraging strike suits

1242

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:3

unintended consequences that would play a large role in
shaping the field of federal securities laws. Most significantly,
there was a large increase in the number of securities class
actions filed in state court.74 After all, “[t]he restrictions added by
[the] PSLRA . . . appl[ied] only to claims brought in federal
court . . . .”75 Due to the concurrent jurisdiction of the Securities
Act, plaintiffs were able to strategically “exploit a jurisdictional
loophole” by bringing suit under state law and in state court.76 In
attempts to circumvent the more stringent procedural
requirements imposed by the PSLRA, such lawsuits were routinely
filed contemporaneously with claims filed in federal court.77
The Exchange Act did not fare much better at avoiding
strike suits than the Securities Act. While the Exchange Act’s
exclusive federal jurisdiction prevented plaintiffs from filing
Exchange Act claims in state court, many states’ securities laws,
as well as common law fraud, provided remedies similar to those
under the Exchange Act.78 Thus, by filing state law claims in state
court, plaintiffs simply avoided federal securities laws entirely.

overall, Congress added a “safe-harbor [provision] for forward-looking statements.” Id.
A plaintiff could not then recover under the anti-fraud provisions if the statement was
accompanied by a cautionary statement that identified “important factors that could
cause actual results to differ materially from those in the . . . statement.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012); id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i).
74 Mazzeo, supra note 19, at 1448 (citing OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL,
UNITED STATES SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS
ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM
ACT OF 1995 (1997), available at http//www.sec.gov/news/studies/lreform.txt.). The SEC
Report was conducted at the request of President Clinton, “in an effort to measure the
level of success the [PSLRA] had achieved in attaining its aforementioned goals.”
Costa, supra note 42, at 1201. The PSLRA did achieve its goal of decreasing the volume
of securities class actions in federal court. Id. at 1202. There was also an “increased
delay between the release of adverse information . . . and the filing of the action,”
evidencing “greater research and investigation” into class action complaints and the
“conclusion that . . . meritorious claims were still developed and brought, [while]
frivolous claims were not.” Id. at 1202-03.
75 Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 675.
76 Serota, supra note 20, at 168. Under the Securities Act of 1933, classaction plaintiffs could generally avoid the heightened requirements of the PSLRA in
two ways: first, plaintiffs could file claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933
directly in state court, where they enjoyed concurrent and non-removable jurisdiction;
second, plaintiffs could file claims in state court based on a state law theory of
securities or common law fraud. See Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 676.
77 See Mazzeo, supra note 19, at 1449. In particular, plaintiffs could take
advantage of more lenient discovery in state court, and use those facts to withstand a
motion to dismiss. Id. Traditionally, state courts did not provide remedies as broad as
federal remedies for securities fraud, but “other advantages [include] nonunanimous
jury verdicts, punitive damages, and aiding and abetting liability.” Id.
78 See Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 676 (citing 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 7.17[2] (5th ed. 2005)).
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Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
(SLUSA)

Congress concluded that the concurrent jurisdiction and
anti-removal provisions of the Securities Act prevented the
PSLRA from accomplishing its goals.79 In 1998, Congress passed
SLUSA.80 “SLUSA sought to cure this infirmity by enacting
‘national standards’ for securities class actions involving
‘nationally traded securities.’”81 SLUSA amended the Securities
Act in order to make federal court the “primary venue for
securities fraud class actions.”82 The ultimate result of the
SLUSA amendment was to allow a defendant to remove certain
preempted claims sounding in state and common law to federal
court, where the claim would be dismissed.
A preempted claim under SLUSA is a “covered class
action based upon the statutory or common law of any State”
alleging a misrepresentation or use of a manipulative or
deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale of a
covered security.83 Preemption only applies to “[c]overed
securities,” securities “listed, or authorized for listing” on a
national exchange such as the New York Stock Exchange or
NASDAQ.84 A preempted claim must also be a “covered class
action,” which is of a form similar but “not identical to a class
action brought under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”85 If the claim is preempted, the class action cannot “be
maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party.”86
See Lowenthal & Haggerty, Jurisdictional Struggle, supra note 54, at S4.
See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998). The bill was introduced by senators Phil Gramm,
Christopher Dodd, Peter V. Domenici, and eleven others. S. REP. No. 105-182, at 1-2
(1998). It “passed by unanimous consent in the Senate, a vote of 319-82 in the House,
and was signed into law by President Clinton.” See Costa, supra note 42, at 1205.
81 Mazzeo, supra note 19, at 1450.
82 See Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 677.
83 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 101, 112 Stat. 3227, 3228
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2012)); see also Kenneth I. Schacter & Mary Gail
Gearns, Removing ‘33 Act Class Actions Under SLUSA and CAFA: Not So Simple, N.Y. L. J.,
Dec. 1, 2008, available at http://www.bingham.com/Publications/Files/2008/12/Removing-33Act-Class-Actions-Under-SLUSA-and-CAFA (internal quotation marks omitted).
84 See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (defining “covered security”); see also Mazzeo, supra
note 19, at 1450. (“Thus, securities traded over-the-counter on the Nasdaq Small
Capital Market are not covered securities, and anti-fraud actions for these securities
are not preempted.”); O’Hare, supra note 64, at 339-40.
85 O’Hare, supra note 64, at 340. A covered class action includes: “(1) actions
brought on behalf of more than 50 persons, (2) actions brought on a representative
basis, and (3) a group of joined or consolidated actions.” Id.; see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 77p(f)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(3)(B).
86 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(1); see also Costa, supra note 42, at 1205.
79
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In order to facilitate bringing preempted claims to
federal court for dismissal, SLUSA added corresponding
removal provisions.87 SLUSA amended Section 22(a) of the
Securities Act to add for an exception to the removal bar, “as
provided in [Section 16(c)].”88 Section 16(c) provides that “[a]ny
covered class action brought in any State court involving a
covered security, as set forth in subsection (b) of this section,
shall be removable to the Federal district court . . . and shall be
subject to subsection (b) of this section.”89 SLUSA also amended
the concurrent jurisdiction provision of the Securities Act so
that state court jurisdiction is still concurrent with federal
jurisdiction “except with respect to . . . ‘covered class actions.’”90
Supporters of this legislation argued that it was
necessary for two reasons. First, preemption of state law-based
securities fraud class actions, for certain nationally traded
securities, was necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the
PSLRA. Second, continued circumvention of the PSLRA could
potentially be “exacerbated by a projected race-to-the-bottom, in
which one or more states enact laws decidedly more favorable to
plaintiffs than federal law.”91 The race-to-the-bottom would be
further exaggerated because “companies with publicly traded
securities cannot control where their securities are traded after
an initial public offering; thus, issuers . . . cannot choose to avoid
jurisdictions that present unreasonable litigation costs.”92
II.

DISTRICT COURT INTERPRETATIONS

“[T]he SLUSA amendment is hardly a model of clarity.”93
There has been considerable judicial confusion about the
removability of pure Securities Act claims filed in state court.
Despite SLUSA’s amendment and the attempt to create a
uniform federal standard, “plaintiffs have continued to bring
class claims under the Securities Act in state courts.”94 These
plaintiffs argue that “SLUSA [has] failed to capture all
securities class actions” because, by its plain language, SLUSA
87 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 §§ 101, 22(a), 28,
112 Stat. 3227, 3230 (amending Section 22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and Section
28 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); see also O’Hare, supra note 64, at 341.
88 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
89 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 101(a)(3), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77p(c); see also Mazzeo, supra note 19, at 1444-50.
90 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a); see also Schacter & Gearns, supra note 83.
91 See Costa, supra note 42, at 1204-05 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92 Mazzeo, supra note 19, at 1451.
93 Id.
94 Lowenthal & Haggarty, SLUSA’s Elimination, supra note 62, at 20.

2014]

SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

1245

does not apply to class actions that “rais[e] claims exclusively
under the Securities Act (without any state law claims).”95
Advocating a narrow interpretation, these plaintiffs assert that
removal is limited to “covered class action[s] based upon the
statutory or common law of any State.”96 Accordingly, removal
does not apply to federal claims—those that arise under the
Securities Act—and thus, defendants continue to be prejudiced
by the circumvention of the PSLRA’s heightened federal
standards.97 District courts principally disagree about whether
the amendment made by SLUSA limits removal to preempted
state law securities class actions, or whether the amendment
also allows for removal of claims arising solely out of the
Securities Act.98
Thus far, federal district courts have reached
inconsistent results. Initial disagreement rested upon conflicting
interpretations of SLUSA’s amendment to the anti-removal
provision of the Securities Act. Some courts took a narrow
approach and looked only to the “plain meaning” of the
Securities Act.99 Other courts, noting an inconsistency between
the removal and pre-emption provisions, took a broad approach
and looked to legislative intent to aid in deciphering the scope of
removal.100 However, an emerging trend has been to ignore
SLUSA’s amendment to the anti-removal provision and instead
look to SLUSA’s amendment to the concurrent jurisdiction
provision of the Securities Act. These courts purport to align
the “plain meaning” of the text with the legislative intent to
create a uniform federal standard.

Id.
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 101, 112 Stat. 3227,
3228 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c)) (emphasis added).
97 Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 670.
98 Schacter & Gearns, supra note 83.
99 See, e.g., Irra v. Lazard Ltd., No. 05-3388, 2006 WL 2375472 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 15, 2006); Pipefitters Local 522 and 633 Pension Trust Fund v. Salem Commc’ns
Corp., No. CV-05-2730, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14202 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2005); Haw.
Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund v. Calpine Corp., No. 03-civ-0714, 2003
U.S. Dist. Lexis 15832 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2003); Nauheim v. Interpublic Group of Cos.,
No. 02-C-9211, 2003 WL 1888843 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2003); In Re Waste Mgmt., Inc.,
194 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
100 See, e.g., Rovner v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07-178, 2007 WL 446658
(D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2007); Alkow v. TXU Corp., No. 3:02-CV-2243-K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7900
(N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003); Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
95
96
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Courts Denying Removal: The Narrow Interpretation of
SLUSA’s Amendment to the Anti-Removal Provision

Courts that have taken a narrow approach in
interpreting SLUSA’s amendment to the Securities Act focus
on the effect of the “three cross-referencing provisions of the
act” and, in doing so, purport to interpret the “plain meaning”
of the statute.101 “It is well settled that courts interpreting a
statute should ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and word
of the statute.’”102 Thus, courts adopting a narrow approach
ultimately conclude that pure Securities Act claims cannot be
removed from the state court in which they are brought.
Courts begin this statutory interpretation by looking to
Section 22(a) of the Securities Act. Section 22(a) provides for an
exception to the anti-removal provision in Section 16(c).103
Section 16(c) excepts from the removal bar “[a]ny covered class
action brought in State court involving a covered security, as
set forth in subsection (b) . . . .”104 Finally, subsection (b), the
preclusion provision, provides for preclusion from federal court
of certain class actions “based upon the statutory or common
law of any State or subdivision thereof . . . .”105 Because Section
101 Lowenthal & Haggarty, Jurisdictional Struggle, supra note 54, at S4. See,
e.g., In re Waste Mgmt., Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 591 (remanding a case alleging only
violations of the Securities Act of 1933. The Court laid out a five-part test for removal
of a claim under SLUSA: “(1) [that] the action is a ‘covered class action’ under SLUSA;
(2) that the causes of action on their face are based on state statutory or common law;
(3) that it involves a ‘covered security’ under SLUSA; (4) that it alleges defendants
misrepresented or omitted material facts; and (5) that the alleged misrepresentation or
omission was made ‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale of the covered security”);
Irra, 2006 WL 2375472 (holding the plaintiff ’ s claims based solely on the Securities
Act were not removable under SLUSA); Pipefitters Local 522 and 633 Pension Trust
Fund, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14202, at *6-7; Haw. Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust
Fund, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15832, at *5-6 (finding that the plain language of 77p(c)
limits removal to class actions based on State claims); Nauheim, No. 02-C-9211, 2003
WL 1888843, at *11 (limiting removal to class actions complaints based on State
statutory or common law).
102 Costa, supra note 42, at 1213 (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt.
Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 100 (1992)).
103 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2012) (“Except as provided in section 77p(c) of this title,
no case arising under this subchapter and brought in any State court of competent
jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States.”).
104 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 101, 112 Stat. 3227,
3228 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2012)) (emphasis added) (“Any covered
class action brought in any State court involving a covered security, as set forth in
subsection (b), shall be removable to the Federal district court for the district in which
the action is pending, and shall be subject to subsection (b).”).
105 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 101, 112 Stat. 3227,
3228 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2012)) (emphasis added) (“No covered
class action based upon the statutory or common law of any State or subdivision thereof
may be maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party alleging- (1) an
untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a
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16(c) specifically cites to the preclusion provision of subsection
(b),106 some courts have found that these three provisions must
be coextensive and that “only actions precluded under
[subsection (b)] are removable under [Section 16(c)], and the
actions removable under [Section 16(c)] are the only actions
removable under [Section] 22(a).”107 Put another way, “if an
action is not preempted by [subsection (b)], then it may not be
removed under Section 22(a).”108 But if the claim is an “entirely
preempted state law action” or a Securities Act claim coupled
with a preempted state law claim, then it may properly be
removed under this interpretation.109
This approach seems to have gained some support from
the United States Supreme Court in its decision in Kircher v.
Putnam Funds Trust.110 The Court, in rather “emphatic and
expansive . . . dicta,”111 stated that there was “no reason to
reject the straightforward reading: removal and jurisdiction to
deal with removed cases is limited to those precluded by the
terms of subsection (b).”112 The Court continued, “If the action is
not precluded [under subsection (b)], the federal court likewise
has no jurisdiction to touch the case on the merits, and the
proper course is to remand to the state court . . . .”113 However,
covered security; or (2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.”).
106 See Serota, supra note 20, at 169-70.
107 Lowenthal & Haggarty, Jurisdictional Struggle, supra note 54, at S4
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lowenthal & Haggarty, SLUSA’s
Elimination, supra note 62, at 23.
108 Lowenthal & Haggarty, SLUSA’s Elimination, supra note 62, at 23.
109 See id.
110 Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633 (2006). The issue in this case
was whether the Seventh Circuit had jurisdiction to review a district court’s decision to
remand a class action securities claim, based on state law, back to state court because
the district court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See Kircher v.
Putnam Funds Trust, No. 03-CV-0691, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10327, at *31-32 (S.D. Ill.
Jan. 27, 2004). The Supreme Court then tackled the issue of whether holders of mutual
fund shares were within the section of SLUSA that “allows for the removal of claims that
arise ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.’” See J. Tyler Butts,
Removal of Covered Class Actions Under SLUSA: The Failure of Plain Meaning and
Legislative Intent as Interpretive Devices, and the Supreme Court’s Decisive Solution, 1
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 169, 189-90 (2010). The ultimate holding was “procedural, not
substantive, when it held that under federal law, the case should never have been heard
on appeal at the federal level.” Id. at 190. But after the “ultimate issue . . . had been
decided, Justice Souter elaborated on the scope of SLUSA and removal generally.” Id.; see
also Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 646-48 (2006).
111 Lowenthal & Haggarty, Jurisdictional Struggle, supra note 54, at S5
(internal quotation marks omitted).
112 Kircher, 547 U.S. at 643; see also Lowenthal & Haggarty, Jurisdictional
Struggle, supra note 54, at S5.
113 Kircher, 547 U.S. at 644. It must also be noted that the Supreme Court was
dealing specifically with the “covered security” provision under subsection (b)(1), and
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the Supreme Court was faced with a state law claim, not a pure
Securities Act claim that district courts currently struggle
with, and perhaps “did not fully explain its rationale.”114
Critics point out that this interpretation of the “inartfully
115
drawn” statute “renders the exception to [Section] 22(a)’s antiremoval provision unnecessary, meaningless and not an exception
at all.”116 “Section 22(a) creates a general rule against the removal
of cases ‘arising under’ the Securities Act, but permits an
exception ‘as provided in Section 16(c).’”117 “[T]o have meaning,
[this section] must apply to some subset of cases that actually
arise under the Securities Act,”118 but a narrow interpretation of
SLUSA would limit removal to preempted claims under
subsection (b), i.e., claims arising under state law.119 Noting this
apparent inconsistency, these critics reason that state law claims
obviously cannot “arise under” the Securities Act,120 but rather,
“arise under state law.”121 The amendments to Section 16(c) and
subsection (b), standing alone, would accomplish the same result
as the narrow interpretation. If Congress did in fact intend to
limit removability to state law claims, SLUSA’s amendment to
Section 22(a) would be superfluous and unnecessary.122
not to subsection (b) as a whole, which includes the state law limitation provision. See
15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)(1) (2012) (“in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
security”); see also 15 U.C. § 77p(b) (“based upon the statutory or common law of any
State or subdivision thereof”). However, it would be internally inconsistent to allow one
provision under subsection (b) to prohibit removal, while not applying the same
interpretation to another provision (the state law limitation) within the same
subsection. See Butts, supra note 110, at 192.
The dicta could fairly be interpreted to suggest that “if a claim fails to meet
any one of the requirements of subsection (b), removal is not an option.” Id. This is in
line with the narrow approach, and if the claim is not based on state law, then it is not
removable under SLUSA. This interpretation was adopted by the District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia in Unschuld, which assumed that “[p]resumably, the
[Supreme Court] was aware of the ongoing dispute about removal of such claims.”
Unschuld v. Tri-S Sec. Corp., No. 06-02931, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68513, at *34 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 14, 2007).
114 See Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 693.
115 Schacter & Gearns, supra note 83.
116 See Lowenthal & Haggarty, Jurisdictional Struggle, supra note 54, at S4-S5.
117 See Lowenthal & Haggarty, SLUSA’s Elimination, supra note 62, at 23; see
also 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
118 See Lowenthal & Haggarty, SLUSA’s Elimination, supra note 62, at 23.
119 See id.
120 See Lowenthal & Haggarty, Jurisdictional Struggle, supra note 54, at S5.
121 See Lowenthal & Haggarty, SLUSA’s Elimination, supra note 62, at 23.
122 See id. This argument was directly addressed in Nauheim. The defendants
argued against removal, but the court found that the language was “made meaningful
by . . . 77p(c)’s preemption of an expressly delineated category of state law class actions.”
Nauheim v. Interpublic Grp. of Cos., No. 02-C-9211, 2003 WL 1888843, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
16, 2003). As one author puts it, however, this assertion is “simply wrong,” and the court
“entirely fail[s] to justify this conclusion.” Costa, supra note 42, at 1210.
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Accordingly, a broader interpretation that includes removal
for pure Securities Act claims gives meaning to the word “except”
in Section 22(a).123 The courts’ narrow interpretation has led to the
“somewhat bizarre and anomalous” result of putting state law
claims in federal court but leaving federal claims in state court.124
However, as the Supreme Court has long acknowledged,
“when the words of the statute are unambiguous[,] ‘judicial
inquiry is complete.’”125 It is the “sole function of the courts,”
when presented with a law containing unambiguous language,
“to enforce it according to its terms.”126 When a statute can be
interpreted on its face, resorting to legislative history is
inappropriate, and the court must presume the statute means
what it says.127 Courts taking a narrow interpretation often
merely recite the words of the statute, followed by “conclusory
summation[s],” as though the meaning is “so obvious that it
needs no more explanation.”128 But such an unambiguous
statute simply does not exist, or else courts would not be
confronted with such widespread divergence of interpretation.
B.

Courts Upholding Removal
1. The Broad Interpretation of SLUSA’s Amendment to
the Anti-Removal Provision

The courts that reject the “plain meaning” approach
apply a much broader reading to determine whether SLUSA

The court in Hawaii Structural recognized the aforementioned
inconsistency within the statute, but concluded that when the “statute is clear” it is
inappropriate to “modify it to effect Congress’s likely intent.” Haw. Structural
Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund v. Calpine Corp., No. 03-CV-0714, 2003 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 15832, at *5-6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2003). However the district court “directly
contradicted itself by calling the statute ‘clear’ and by simultaneously recognizing the
‘inconsistency’ in its language.” Costa, supra note 42, at 1211.
123 See Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 683-85.
124 Lowenthal & Haggarty, SLUSA’s Elimination, supra note 62, at 23
(internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
125 Costa, supra note 42, at 1213 (citing Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503
U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126 Costa, supra note 42, at 1213 (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470, 485 (1917)).
127 Costa, supra note 42, at 1213 (citing Conn. Nat’l Bank, 503 U.S. at 254).
128 Butts, supra note 110, at 182 (citing No. 02-C-9211, 2003 WL 1888843, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2003). “[O]ne . . . gets the impression that the court had made up its
mind before considering the . . . statute.” Butts, supra note 110, at 183. While it is true
that in their minds the statute may be clear and unambiguous, the courts should
recognize that it is at least arguably “dense and potentially confusing” and they “would
do well to explain more thoroughly how they reached their conclusion.” Id.
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permits removal of pure Securities Act claims.129 They typically
look beyond the text and focus on the purpose of SLUSA to
supplement their interpretation of the otherwise confusing
statute.130 Accordingly, these courts believe that their
interpretation is in line with Congress’s decision to “remedy the
PSLRA’s failure to ‘prevent abuses in private securities fraud
lawsuits’” and Congress’s perceived need to enact “national
standards for securities class action lawsuits.”131 Thus, courts
adopting a broad approach ultimately conclude that pure
Securities Act claims are removable from state court.
“When statutory language is open to more than one
reasonable interpretation, courts attempt to find the meaning
‘which can most fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, in
the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the
general purposes that Congress manifested.’”132 Congress enacted
the PSLRA to curtail “strike suits,” but it failed to achieve its goal
because plaintiffs simply avoided filing in federal court.133
Congress subsequently enacted SLUSA134 “to realize the intent of
the [PSLRA] . . . [and ensure] that class action suits for securities
that are traded on the . . . major securities trading

129 See, e.g., Rovner v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07-178, 2007 WL 446658, at *4
(D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2007) (in deciding that pure Securities Act claims belong in federal court, the
court stressed that the statute should be read in the context in which it was written); Alkow
v. TXU Corp., No. 3:02-CV-2243-K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7900, at *6 (N.D. Tex. May 8,
2003) (holding that removal of a class action asserting pure Securities Act claims was proper
under SLUSA); Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
(finding that SLUSA permits removal when a plaintiff alleges only Securities Act claims).
130 Lowenthal & Haggarty, SLUSA’s Elimination, supra note 62, at 24; see
also TXU Corp., No. 3:02-CV-2243-K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7900, at *4-6 (where the
court looked to legislative findings to support its interpretation of SLUSA).
131 See Serota, supra note 20, at 170 (citing Brody, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 1124)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Congress expressly set forth its goal in enacting
SLUSA under the “Findings” section of the Act:

The Congress finds that . . . in order to prevent certain State private securities class
action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, it is appropriate to enact national
standards for securities class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities,
while preserving the appropriate enforcement powers of State securities regulators
and not changing the current treatment of individual lawsuits.
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2, 112
Stat. 3227, 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012)).
132 Butts, supra note 110, at 186 (quoting Comm’r v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206,
217 (1984)).
133 Lowenthal & Haggerty, SLUSA’s Elimination, supra note 62, at 21.
134 Thirteen senators co-introduced S. 1260, later enacted as SLUSA, on
October 7, 1997. See 143 CONG. REC. S10475 (1997) (statements of Sen. Gramm).
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exchanges . . . [are] subject to the rules that we passed last time
[in the PSLRA] and . . . go to federal court.”135
Senator Phil Gramm of Texas, one of the two chief cosponsors of SLUSA, stated that “in the case of class-action
suits, . . . if a stock is traded on the national market . . . then the
class action-suit has to be filed in federal court.”136 The other
chief co-sponsor, Senator Chris Dodd of Connecticut has
commented that the “one development . . . that has the potential
to undermine our good work and send us back to the days of
litigation frenzy . . . is the significant increase in securities fraud
class actions filed in State court.”137 Senator Dodd was also very
concerned about having to subject foreign companies to not only
“very tough Federal standards on securities fraud, but also the
possibility of 50 constantly changing State standards.”138 In the
view of courts interpreting SLUSA broadly, certain statements by
some members of the legislature “prove conclusively that
Congress meant to remove all securities claims from State court,
and simply fell victim to sloppy or misleading drafting.”139
These legislator’s comments reflect the view that the
problem under the PSLRA was not that plaintiffs were bringing
state law claims, but rather that those claims were being brought
in state court.140 Congress enacted SLUSA in response to the
perceived failings of the PSLRA, and, accordingly, “the goals of
each are inextricably intertwined . . . .”141 Thus, some argue, the
only way to prevent circumvention of the PSLRA by plaintiffs
asserting pure Securities Act claims is to interpret the SLUSA’s
removal amendment broadly.142 As Thomas Bliley, Jr., U.S.
Representative from Virginia, explained before the House of
Representatives, “The premise of this legislation is simple:
lawsuits alleging violations that involve securities that are offered
nationally belong to Federal court.”143 It is clear that at least some
135 Lowenthal & Haggerty, SLUSA’s Elimination, supra note 62, at 21
(quoting Sec. Litig. Unif. Standards Act: Hearing on H.R. 1689 Before the Fin. and
Hazardous Subcomm. of the House Commerce Comm., 105th Cong. 105-85 (1998)
(comments of Rep. Rick White)).
136 143 CONG. REC. S10475-01, § 10475 (1997) (comments of Sen. Gramm).
137 Id. § 10476 (comments of Sen. Dodd).
138 Id.
139 Butts, supra note 110, at 188.
140 See Lowenthal & Haggerty, SLUSA’s Elimination, supra note 62, at 24.
141 Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 696.
142 See id., at 697.
143 144 CONG. REC. S11020 (1998) (comments of Rep. Bliley). Some courts
have found this quote to assist in deciphering the text and purpose of the statute. See
Butts, supra note 110, at 188 (citing Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122,
1124 (C.D. Cal. 2003)).
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members of Congress sought to create federal uniformity and
eliminate class action claims in state court.144
The Supreme Court offered its own guidance favoring a
broad interpretation in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith
Inc. v. Dabit.145 The Court specifically addressed whether
SLUSA precluded state law holder claims, but language in the
opinion “suggests that the Court would support the broad
reading of [Section 16(c)] and extend removal authority to
[pure] Securities Act claims.”146 The Court “purported to follow
congressional intent”147 and noted the “congressional preference
for ‘national standards for securities class action lawsuits.’”148
The Court stated that the “magnitude of the federal interest in
protecting the integrity and efficient operation of the market
for nationally traded securities cannot be overstated.”149 The
Court also recognized that the purpose of SLUSA was “[t]o
stem this shift from Federal to State courts and prevent certain
State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud
from being used to frustrate the objectives of [the PSLRA].”150
The narrow interpretation would certainly undercut the
effectiveness of the PSLRA by permitting pure Securities Act
class actions to remain in state court. While it seems clear that
the Supreme Court’s broad language in Dabit and its narrow
language in Kircher are contradictory,151 “the Court’s broad
policy language . . . may be more indicative of [its] view of
securities laws [in general]” than its more narrow statutory
analysis of a specific provision.152 Thus it is possible that the
Court could “abandon its dicta in Kircher and construe the
See Lowenthal & Haggerty, SLUSA’s Elimination, supra note 62, at 24.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
146 See Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 683-85 (citing Dabit, 547 U.S. at 88-89).
On the ultimate issue, the Court refused to limit preclusion of claims “in connection
with the purchase or sale” to only claims involving a “purchase or sale.” Dabit, 547 U.S.
at 89; see also Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 690.
147 Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 691. “[T]he Court also appeared comfortable
allowing policy to dictate statutory interpretation in this area of the law . . . [because
it] had previously done so in Blue Chip Stamps.” Id. (citing Dabit, 547 U.S. at 80, 84).
The Court in Dabit noted that in Blue Chip Stamps, a rule 10b-5 case, it had “relied
chiefly, and candidly, on ‘policy considerations.’” Dabit, 547 U.S. at 84 (citation
omitted); see also Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 691.
148 Dabit, 547 U.S. at 87 (quoting Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2(5), 112 Stat. at 3227, 3227 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78(a) (2012)); see also Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 691.
149 Dabit, 547 U.S. at 78; see also Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 691.
150 Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151 In Kircher, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that “removal jurisdiction
under subsection (c) is understood to be restricted to precluded actions defined by
subsection (b) . . . .” Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 643-44 (2006).
152 See Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 693.
144

145
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[anti-]removal provision . . . to cover [pure] Securities Act
claims,” especially when “[s]uch a reading is also more
consistent with . . . congressional intent.”153
Aside from statements by some legislators, opponents of
this broad interpretation argue that actually effectuating
Congress’s purported intent “could not have been simpler.”154 If
Congress really intended for removal of pure Securities Act
claims, it could have easily added a sentence clarifying as such.
While sporadic statements can be read as authorizing removal
of pure Securities Act claims, “the issue is never addressed nor
supported directly.”155 Perhaps, the legislative body as a whole
did not agree entirely with some of the more vocal members.156 In
fact, proponents of a narrow interpretation can simply point to
the first sentence of SLUSA, which states that SLUSA’s purpose
is “to limit the conduct of securities class actions under State
law.”157 Because they see the legislative history as “murky,”158
courts that interpret SLUSA narrowly find legislative history
unreliable to the extent that any analysis into it would be
superfluous.159 As Judge Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, has said, “Consulting

Id.
See Costa, supra note 42, at 1217.
155 See id. at 1220.
156 See id. at 1222. It is possible that the current legislation is merely a
compromise, and “[h]ad SLUSA explicitly allowed removal of all class actions arising
under the Securities Act, it may . . . have lacked the political support to pass the 105th
Congress.” Id. at 1122-23. The 105th Congress was controlled by a Republican majority
in both houses and at the time “the Republican majority was generally concerned with
federalism, and with ‘returning authority to the states.’” Id. at 1123 (citing A.C.
Pritchard, Constitutional Federalism, Individual Liberty, and the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 435, 435 (2000)). In the 105th
Congress, the Senate was composed of 55 Republicans and 45 Democrats and the House
was composed of 228 Republicans, 206 Democrats, and 1 Independent. See Costa, supra
note 42, at 1223 n.203 (citing S. PUB. 105-20, at 2-3 (1997)).
For example, the Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1998, H.R. 3789, 105th
Cong. (1998), “stalled in the Republican-controlled legislature.” Costa, supra note 42, at
1223 n.205. The Class Action Jurisdiction Act would have provided for removal of “any
class action to federal court by any defendant or non-representative plaintiff whenever
one member of the plaintiff class was a citizen of a different state than any defendant.”
Id. While it is true that “[t]he Class Action Jurisdiction Act was much broader in scope
than SLUSA,” because it applied to any class action, it is conceivable that SLUSA “may
have met a similar fate” had it attempted to “expand the federal jurisdiction by
allowing for removal of all class actions” under the Securities Act of 1933.
157 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (emphasis added); see also Butts, supra note 110, at 187.
158 See Unschuld v. Tri-S Sec. Corp., No. 06-02931, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68513, at *27 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2007).
159 See Butts, supra note 110, at 187.
153
154
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legislative history is like ‘looking over a crowd of people and
picking out your friends.’”160
It must also be noted that SLUSA amended both the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act in an “almost identical
fashion” with respect to their clauses, precluding state law
claims.161 Some interpret this symmetry to mean that Congress
really must have intended for SLUSA to cover both state law
claims and pure Securities Act claims.162 Because the Exchange
Act granted exclusive federal jurisdiction to claims arising under
it, the only method plaintiffs could use to circumvent the PSLRA
was to allege state law claims in state court.163 Accordingly,
160 See Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable
Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813 (1998). Judge Kozinski was quoting the
words of Judge Harold Leventhal, who served on the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals from 1965 to 1979; see also Butts, supra note 110, at 186 n.100.
161 Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 688. Section 16 of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77p (b)–(c) (2012), provides:

(b) Class action limitations: No covered class action based upon the statutory
or common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any
State or Federal court by any private party alleging(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security; or
(2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.
(c) Removal of covered class actions: Any covered class action brought in any
State court involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b), shall
be removable to the Federal district court for the district in which the action
is pending, and shall be subject to subsection (b).
Section 29(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78bb(f), provides:
(1) Class action limitations: No covered class action based upon the statutory
or common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any
State or Federal court by any private party alleging(A) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security; or
(B) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
security.
(2) Removal of covered class actions: Any covered class action brought in any
State court involving a covered security, as set forth in paragraph (1), shall
be removable to the Federal district court for the district in which the action
is pending, and shall be subject to paragraph (1).
162 See Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 688-90 (“The broad reading . . . gives
purpose to the amendment to the Securities Act by interpreting it to extend removal
authority to [pure] Securities Act claims . . . .”).
163 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (“The district courts of the United States and the United
States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce
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SLUSA’s amendment to the Exchange Act was perfectly tailored
to allow removal of these state law claims into federal court, thus
making it the exclusive venue for claims that, in substance,
alleged violations of the Exchange Act. Because Congress
intended all federal and state law securities fraud claims relating
to the Exchange Act to be in federal court, it could also be argued
that they intended the same result for the Securities Act—that
both state law securities fraud claims and pure Securities Act
claims should be removable to federal court.164
Yet this reasoning does not necessitate the conclusion that
Congress intended federal court to be the exclusive forum for all
class action securities fraud claims arising under the Securities
Act or the Exchange Act. SLUSA’s amendment to the Exchange
Act applies only to removal of state law claims because the
Exchange Act lacks a concurrent jurisdiction provision, and
hence, “pure” Exchange Act claims already enjoy exclusive federal
jurisdiction.165 Because there was no need to address removal for
pure Exchange Act claims, the anti-removal provision simply does
not apply to them. A consistent application of almost the same
statutory language lends support to the argument that SLUSA’s
amendment to the anti-removal provision of the Securities Act
also applies to claims solely alleging state law securities fraud.
2. SLUSA’s Amendment to the Concurrent Jurisdiction
Provision
There is still the possibility that Congress intended to
limit SLUSA’s removal amendment only to state law claims, as a
narrow reading of the amendment would suggest, and yet still
intended to make federal courts the exclusive venue for class
action securities fraud claims. While much of the focus in recent
years has been on the effect of SLUSA’s amendment to the
Securities Act’s anti-removal provision, an emerging trend among
district courts has been to focus on another one of SLUSA’s
amendments: the amendment to the concurrent jurisdiction
provision of the Securities Act.166 Although the end result is the
same as the broad interpretation of SLUSA’s amendment to the
anti-removal provision (that pure Securities Act claims are
removable), courts adopting this emerging concurrent jurisdiction
any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.”
(emphasis added)).
164 See Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 688-90.
165 See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
166 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (emphasis added).
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approach have found that this method is “rooted in both the text
and the congressional findings underlying the SLUSA
amendments.”167 Relying on the plain meaning of SLUSA’s
amendment to the concurrent jurisdiction provision, these courts
have concluded that state courts are no longer “court[s] of
competent jurisdiction”168 for claims arising under the Securities
Act. Therefore, the removal bar does not apply to them at all so
that they can be removed just like any other federal claim.
While some courts had commented in dicta on SLUSA’s
change to the concurrent jurisdiction provision of section
22(a),169 it was not until the District of New Jersey handed
down two rulings in 2007 that a court explicitly found that
SLUSA’s amendment to the concurrent jurisdiction provision,
not the anti-removal provision, allowed for removal of pure
Securities Act claims.170 Section 22(a) of the Securities Act
provides for federal jurisdiction that is “concurrent with State
and Territorial courts, except as provided in [Section 16] with
respect to covered class actions, of all suits . . . brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this subchapter.”171
Thus, the amendment provides for an exception to the general
rule of concurrent jurisdiction if the suit: (1) is brought to
enforce the rights and liabilities created by the Securities Act,
and (2) is a covered class action as provided in Section 16.172
The scope of the exception to concurrent jurisdiction can
therefore be found in Section 16 of the Act.173 Subsections (b),
(c), and (d) to this provision refer to state law claims and thus,
by definition, are not “brought to enforce the rights and
liabilities created by the Securities Act.”174 Subsection (f),
Serota, supra note 20, at 171.
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (emphasis added).
169 See Rubin v. Pixelplus Co., No. 06-CV-2964, 2007 WL 778485, at *3-4
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2007); see also Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
170 In Rovner v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07 Civ. 178, 2007 WL 446658
(D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2007), and Pinto v. Vonage Holding Corp., No. 07 Civ. 0062, 2007 WL
1381746 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2007), Judge Freda Wolfson was the first to focus on the
jurisdictional amendment as the basis for denying remand, instead of the anti-removal
provision. See Lowenthal & Haggerty, Jurisdictional Struggle, supra note 54, at S5. She
found that “there exists exclusive federal jurisdiction over claims which (i) are brought to
enforce the rights and liabilities created by the Securities Act; and (ii) are covered class
actions.” Id. Judge Wolfson ultimately concluded that pure Securities Act claims are
removable, not because the SLUSA amendment provides for removal, but because “state
courts lack[ ] jurisdiction over [pure] Securities Act claims in the first place.” See id.
171 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (emphasis added).
172 See Lowenthal & Haggarty, SLUSA’s Elimination, supra note 62, at 22;
Lowenthal & Haggarty, Jurisdictional Struggles, supra note 54, at S5.
173 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
174 Id. § 77p. See Lowenthal & Haggarty, Jurisdictional Struggles, supra note
54, at S14; see also Knox v. Agria Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The plaintiffs
167

168
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however, is the definition section and sets forth the meaning of
a “covered class action” as:
[A]ny single lawsuit in which . . . one or more named parties seek
to recover damages on a representative basis on behalf of
themselves and other unnamed parties similarly situated, and
questions of law or fact common to those persons or members of the
prospective class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual persons or members.175

On its face, a “covered class action” seems to apply to “any
single lawsuit” that meets the definition, and therefore includes
pure Securities Act claims. As Judge William Pauley concluded,
“Section 16 . . . does not add a substantive limitation to the
exception to concurrent jurisdiction in Section 22(a).”176 Thus the
effect of SLUSA’s amendment is to replace “concurrent
jurisdiction with exclusive federal jurisdiction over ‘covered class
actions . . . brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the
Securities Act].’”177
As Judge Pauley points out, the anti-removal provision
of Section 22(a) provides that “no case arising under [the
Securities Act] and brought in any State court of competent
jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United
States.”178 Because SLUSA’s amendment to the concurrent
jurisdiction provision of Section 22(a) replaced concurrent
jurisdiction with exclusive federal jurisdiction, state courts are
in Knox filed their putative class action in the New York Supreme Court asserting pure
Securities Act claims, while there were three federal securities class actions simultaneously
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. Id. at 421. The plaintiff
explicitly stated in his complaint that the state court had subject-matter jurisdiction, and
could not be removed. Id. at 421. The defendants, however, removed the action, and the
district court denied the motion to remand, finding that (1) the class actions asserting pure
Securities Act claims were removable to federal court, and (2) state courts lacked
jurisdiction over such claims, insomuch that the state court must dismiss any claims that
were not removed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. at 421; see also Serota,
supra note 20, at 171. This issue arose again in the Southern District of New York in
Kramer v. Fannie Mae, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 109888 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The court, faced with
a class action asserting pure Securities Act claims, rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that
the action should be remanded, stating that Knox’s conclusion that “no state court has
subject matter jurisdiction over covered class actions raising 1933 Act claims” is the proper
interpretation of SLUSA’s amendments to the Securities Act. Id. at *10 (citing Knox, 613 F.
Supp. 2d 419, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
175 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(A)(i)(II).
176 Knox, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 423. It is still clear, however, that SLUSA’s
amendments do not reach individual actions brought in state court. See Cal. Pub.
Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 98 (2d Cir. 2004) (“SLUSA did not
in any way alter Section 22(a)’s bar on removal of individual Securities Act claims[.]”);
see also Lowenthal & Haggarty, SLUSA’s Elimination, supra note 62, at 22.
177 Lowenthal & Haggarty, SLUSA’s Elimination, supra note 62, at 21 (citing
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)).
178 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (emphasis added).
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no longer courts of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, pure
Securities Act claims are no longer covered by the anti-removal
provision at all.179 As a result, defendants are no longer limited
by the “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress”180 provision, and they may successfully remove pure
Securities Act claims as they would any other federal claim,
through the general removal mechanism of Section 1441(a).181
Some have been critical of this recent approach, finding
that it lacks sufficient support from other courts.182 It appears,
however, that this interpretation is becoming more of an
emerging trend, as more courts are adopting it.183 One of the
most recent decisions to address the removal of pure Securities
Act claims was Lapin v. Facebook, Inc.,184 where the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California
was faced with several putative class actions asserting pure
Securities Act claims against Facebook. Despite authority in
other California districts finding that SLUSA’s amendment
does not provide for removal of pure Securities Act claims,185
Judge Maxine Chesney reached the opposite conclusion.186 She
found that “federal courts alone have jurisdiction to hear
covered class actions raising [pure Securities Act] claims.”187
See Lowenthal & Haggarty, Jurisdictional Struggles, supra note 54, at S14.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see also Costa, supra note 42, at 1198 (“Congress
has reserved the right to circumscribe removal in all cases in which they chose to do so
in . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1441.”).
181 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
182 See Butts, supra note 110, at 195-96. Butts is also critical of the Knox
court’s dismissal of Kircher as “inapplicable and ‘not to the contrary.’” Id. at 196. Butts
argues that Knox misunderstood the meaning of dicta, and even though Kircher “did
not have to explicitly decide the federal law removal question in its decision, . . . [d]icta
are statements made in a decision that . . . are nonetheless important to the deciding
court.” Id. Thus the Knox court should have accorded the Supreme Court’s decision
“more respect than . . . [a] cursory dismissal.” Id.
183 Lapin v. Facebook, Inc., No. C-12-3195, 2012 WL 3647409, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 23, 2012).
184 Id.
185 See, e.g., W. Palm Beach Police Pension Fund v. Cardionet, Inc., No. 10-cv711-L(NLS), 2011 WL 1099815, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2011) (holding SLUSA limits
removal to class actions alleging securities fraud under state law, and remanding a
class action asserting pure Securities Act claims).
186 See Lapin v. Facebook, Inc., No. C-12-3195, 2012 WL 3647409 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
23, 2012) (finding the reasoning of Knox to be persuasive, and adopting its conclusion).
187 Lapin, 2012 WL 3647409, at *2 (quoting Knox v. Agria Corp., 613 F. Supp.
2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). Following this decision, motions were made pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1407 before the United State Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to
transfer the numerous actions relating to the Facebook IPO to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. See Notice of Hearing Session, In
re Facebook, Inc., IPO Securities and Derivative Litigation, MDL No. 2389 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 8, 2012). The motion sought to consolidate 15 actions from the Northern District
of California, as well as actions from the Middle District of Florida and Western
District of Missouri, with the 26 pending actions in the Southern District of New York
179

180
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Relying on SLUSA’s amendment to the concurrent jurisdiction
provision of the Securities Act, the Court found that “the [anti]removal provision in [Section 22(a)] . . . no longer applies to ‘a
covered class action’ alleging [pure Securities Act claims], and,
consequently, [they are] removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a).”188 The court noted that SLUSA’s legislative history, with
its focus on correcting and strengthening the PSLRA189 and its goal
of “national standards for securities class action lawsuits involving
nationally traded securities,”190 supports the “plain meaning”
interpretation of the concurrent jurisdiction provision.191
Only months later, the District Court for the Northern
District of California was given an opportunity to reinforce its
decision in Lapin.192 On August 1, 2012, a class action against
Zynga, Inc., a provider of social game services, commenced in
California state court. Defendants subsequently removed the case
to the District Court for the Northern District of California.193 On
October 25, 2012, the plaintiff, Robert Reyes, filed a motion to
remand the case back to state court.194 Despite Judge Chesney’s
recent ruling in Lapin, Judge White for the Northern District of
California granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand the case.195
Noting the “divided district courts within this district and around
the country,” the court concluded that the narrow approach was
more persuasive.196 While the defendants “raise[d] valid
for pre-trial proceedings. Id. The motion included the Lapin, Spatz, Lazar, Stokes, and
DeMois actions mentioned supra. See supra notes 7, 9, 10 and accompanying text.
On October 4, 2012, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation transferred the actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to Judge Robert. W.
Sweet, District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York, for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings. See Transfer Order, In re Facebook, Inc., IPO
Securities and Derivative Litigation, No. 12-MDL-2389 at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2012). In
addition, several of the actions originally filed in California state court filed notices of
voluntary dismissal. See, e.g., Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Lapin v. Facebook, Inc.,
No. 12-Civ-7543-RWS (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2012); Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Lazar v.
Facebook, Inc., No. 12-Civ-7546-RWS (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2012).
188 Lapin, 2012 WL 3647409, at *3.
189 See id. at *2.
190 Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2(5), 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified as
Note to 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012))).
191 See id. at *3 (citing H.R. REP. 105-802, at 13 (1998) (“The purpose of . . .
[SLUSA] is to prevent plaintiffs from seeking to evade the protections that Federal law
provides against abusive litigation by filing suit in State, rather than in Federal,
court.”)).
192 Id.
193 Notice of Removal ¶ 1, Reyes v. Zynga, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 5065 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
194 See Plaintiff ’ s Motion to Remand at 1, Reyes v. Zynga, Inc., No. 12 Civ.
5065 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
195 See Order Granting Motion to Remand, Reyes v. Zynga, Inc., No. 12 Civ.
5065 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
196 Id. at 3-5.
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arguments about inconsistencies between Section [22(a)] and
Sections [16(b)] and [16(c)],” the court also found that “there are
plausible ways to construe Section [22(a)] to avoid any such
inconsistencies.”197 Given the “lack of clear authority from the
Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit on this issue,” as well as the split
among district courts, the court followed the principle “that any
doubt about the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor
of remand.”198 To further add to the inconsistency among district
courts, Judge White admitted that “given the intent of SLUSA[,]
it just makes no sense to prohibit the removal of federal securities
class actions to federal court.”199
Because the concurrent jurisdiction approach aligns the
plain meaning of the SLUSA amendment with congressional
intent, district courts should continue to adopt it when analyzing
the removal of pure Securities Act claims. Following this trend is
all the more important because federal appellate courts have yet to
address the removability of pure Securities Act claims, despite the
significant split authority on the issue among district courts.200 And
even with the emerging prominence of the concurrent jurisdiction
approach, it appears that no conclusive answer can be expected.
District court decisions are persuasive, not binding, authority on
each other, “even in the same district, and the district judges are
free to resolve legal questions like these unless there is controlling
circuit or Supreme Court authority.”201 These problems are
exacerbated because district court decisions ordering remand are
“not reviewable on appeal,”202 as “[f]ederal appellate courts can
197 Id. at 5. The Court also concluded that while the legislative history does
suggest that “SLUSA was amended to make federal courts the exclusive venue for most
class actions alleging securities fraud, . . . the legislative history is, itself, murky
insofar as it suggests an answer to the question before the Court.” Id. at 5-6.
198 Id. at 6 (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)).
199 Id. at 6 (citing Unschuld v. Tri-S Sec. Corp., No. 6 Civ. 2931, 2007 WL
2729011, at *8-9 (N.D. Ga. 2009)).
200 See Plaintiff ’ s Motion to Remand 1933 Act Claims Denied: Court Holds
Only Federal Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Such Claims, MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY &
MCCOY LLP 3 (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.milbank.com/images/content/8/4/840/022409SLUSA-and-1933-ACT-Claims.pdf. Though the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has stated that 77p(c) excepts “‘class actions brought in state court’
from . . . the [anti-]removal provision and provides that those class actions ‘shall be
removable to the Federal court for the district in which the action is pending.’” Cal.
Pub. Employees’ Retirement Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 97 (2d Cir. 2004)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c)) (arguably in dicta).
201 MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCOY LLP 3, supra note 200. Compare Irra
v. Lazard Ltd., 2006 WL 2375472 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006) (remanding pure Securities Act
claims), with Rubin v. Pixelplus Co., No. 06-CV-2964, 2007 WL 778485 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13,
2007) (denying remand).
202 MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCOY LLP 3, supra note 200 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d)) (“An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise . . . .”).
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hear appeals from only final decisions, and denials of remand are
not considered final.”203 This leaves parties who wish to appeal the
decision to remand a removed case with two options: (1) a
mandamus or interlocutory appeal, or (2) the issue must be raised
on direct appeal at the case’s end.204 The former is a highly
discretionary device, while the latter rarely arises because “most
securities actions are dismissed or settled . . . .”205 Absent
congressional action on the issue, plaintiffs will be able to
continually forum shop for jurisdictions where federal judges are
likely to remand to the state courts.
III.

INVESTOR PROTECTION

Regardless of the approach taken, allowing removal of
pure Securities Act claims to federal court aligns with
congressional intent and furthers the goal of investor protection,
which lies at the heart of the Securities Act. Only by interpreting
SLUSA to permit removal of covered class actions asserting pure
Securities Act claims can the PSLRA fully accomplish its goal of
“decreasing [the] vexatious strike suits” that harm investors.206
“The private securities litigation system is too important
to the integrity of American capital markets to allow this system
to be undermined by those who seek to line their own pockets by
bringing abusive and meritless suits.”207 The “in terrorem” effect
of plaintiffs bringing groundless claims encourages massive
settlements to avoid the potential for more devastating
judgments.208 If the trend from the first half of 2013 continues,
there will be approximately 222 new securities class actions filed
in 2013, each with an average settlement value of $78 million,
which is more than double the six-year average of $35 million.209
Because strike suits have such a high settlement value, without
regard to actual culpability, the ultimate effect is to harm not only
the innocent corporation, but its owners as well, the investors.
Permitting removal of pure Securities Act claims will
prevent the meritless harassment of corporations by plaintiffs
Id.
See id.
205 See id.
206 Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 698.
207 H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-31
(comments of the PSLRA Conference Committee Report); see also Snyder, Jr., supra
note 45, at 698.
208 See Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 699.
209 See Kobi Kastiel, 2013 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update, HLS FORUM ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, (Aug. 4, 2013, 10:21 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/08/04/2013-mid-year-securities-litigation-update/.
203
204
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that sidestep the safeguards of the PSLRA, the cornerstone of
Congress’s fight against abusive securities litigation. By enacting
the PSLRA, Congress hoped to protect the innocent investors
from the greedy ones, those who exploit meritless claims into
large settlements. Through a number of procedural and
jurisdictional reforms, the PSLRA made it increasingly difficult to
bring securities class actions under federal securities laws.210 For
example, under the new rules imposed by the PSLRA, covered
class actions brought in federal court could take three years to
arrive at the same point in litigation that a comparable case
brought in state court would reach in only a few days.211 The
ultimate benefit of permitting removal of pure Securities Act
claims will be to decrease the number of vexatious strike suits,
which in turn “protect[s] investors, who are ‘always the ultimate
losers when extortionate “settlements” are extracted from
issuers.’”212
SLUSA and the PSLRA also work to encourage individual
action by institutional investors.213 Neither SLUSA nor the
procedural protections of the PSLRA apply to individual suits in
state court.214 Institutional investors, such as large stakeholders,
can file their own individual suits in state court and “avoid the
costly and time-consuming burdens of PSLRA.”215 Furthermore,
individual suits do not pose the same risk of harassment because
the individual will bear the cost of litigation himself, including the
cost of losing.216 An interested institutional investor is also much
more likely to be looking out for the interests of smaller investors
than a “‘professional plaintiff’s’ lawyer,”217 and permitting pure
Securities Act claims to be remanded back to state court may
encourage these institutional investors to once again become
See supra, part I.C.
See Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 698 (citing Jonathan F. Mack, PSLRA
and SLUSA: Laws with Unintended Consequences, WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC.
ELEC. AGE 1 (Nov. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
212 Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 700 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32).
213 Id.
214 State causes of action in general are not prohibited, rather covered class
actions asserting such claims are preempted. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, &
Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006). “This . . . reflects Congress’s additional concern
for the class action’s potential for abuse.” Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 701.
215 Snyder, Jr., supra note 45, at 701. “[T]he combined effect . . . has been that
nearly every major class action securities fraud case is now accompanied by intensely
litigated individual actions by institutions that never brought such suits ten years
ago.” Id. (citing Jonathan F. Mack, PSLRA and SLUSA: Laws with Unintended
Consequences, WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. ELEC. AGE 1 (Nov. 2003)).
216 See id.
217 See id. (quoting Keith L. Johnson, Deterrence of Corporate Fraud Through
Securities Litigation: The Role of Institutional Investors, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155,
155 (Autumn 1997)).
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“satisfied to quietly wait on the sidelines and take a modest
check as a class member.”218 Thus a narrow reading of SLUSA’s
amendments “would deprive the market of the benefit of more
active participation of institutional investors.”219
CONCLUSION
For almost 80 years, the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act have worked to protect investors from the misdeeds of
corporations. They remained largely untouched until the 1990s,
when Congress saw fit to protect investors from a new harm: the
vexatious strike suits initiated and maintained by fellow investors.
Congress enacted the PSLRA under the assumption that “both
investors and the national economy suffer when innocent parties
are forced to pay ‘exorbitant settlements’ in meritless lawsuits.”220
When plaintiffs began to circumvent the PSLRA, Congress
responded by enacting SLUSA and established national standards
for securities class actions involving nationally traded securities.221
SLUSA bolstered the effectiveness of the PSLRA by making federal
court the exclusive venue for certain class actions.
These efforts were hampered, however, because of the
poor and confusing drafting of the amendment. SLUSA’s
amendment to the anti-removal provision of the Securities Act
resulted in conflicting broad and narrow interpretations. Both
interpretations have received support from the Supreme Court,
but both ultimately have large flaws that prevent either from
gaining traction among federal district courts. The narrow
interpretation attempts to find the plain meaning of the
statute, but it does so in a conclusory fashion. It fails to
acknowledge the confusion that the poorly written statute
creates. The broad interpretation acknowledges the confusion
and instead looks to the legislative intent for clarity. While
certain statements of members of the legislature certainly
support the notion that SLUSA was meant to make federal
court the exclusive venue for class actions, these statements
alone have been insufficient to persuade many district courts.
The result of this district court split has enabled the continued
circumvention of the PSLRA and the continued use of vexatious
Id. n.217 (citing Mack, supra note 215 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 702. The PSLRA also encourages the appointment of such
institutional investors as lead plaintiff, who have an incentive to maximize recoveries
in class action lawsuits. Id. at 702-03.
220 Mazzeo, supra note 19, at 1446.
221 Id. 1450-51.
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strike suits by plaintiffs to harass innocent defendantcorporations into settlements. The conflicting approaches also
encourage forum shopping by plaintiffs, and the persuasive
nature of district court authority makes litigation even more
unpredictable and expensive for all parties involved.
As this note demonstrates, a third interpretation of
SLUSA’s amendment to the Securities Act has garnered some
support among the district courts. By addressing SLUSA’s
amendment to the concurrent jurisdiction provision, this
interpretation looks to both the plain meaning of the text and
the legislative history in concluding that class actions asserting
pure Securities Act claims are excluded from federal court.
Instead, these claims are trusted to the federal courts, as
Congress intended. District Court judges should continue to adopt
this analysis because allowing removal of purely federal claims
avoids the paradox of keeping federal claims in state court222 and
furthers the goals of investor protection by allowing the
protections of the PSLRA to take full effect.
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